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The Big Destructiveness Of The Tiny Bribe

Alexandra Wrage 03.01.2010

    The smallest bribes can be the most vexing. Not suitcases full of money and transfers to offshore accounts, but the thousands of everyday payments people make to Indian building inspectors, Chinese customs officials and Nigerian airport functionaries, just to get things done. They’re payments for routine government services that a government official is legally obliged to perform but for which he’s hoping to skim off a little extra.

    Unlike more serious bribes, these very modest payouts, formally known as “facilitating payments”, are not against the laws of the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Korea, when made abroad. They’re illegal for Great Britain, but the Serious Fraud Office there has taken the extraordinary public position that they’re unlikely to give rise to a prosecution.

    Why don’t governments that lead the fight against large-scale bribery fall in line with what is already the practice of many major companies? They don’t want to outlaw such small-scale graft in foreign places, they say, because they don’t have the manpower to prosecute violators. By that logic, communities with just enough resources to handle murder and armed robbery would give a green light to shoplifting. You’d think a government could at least go after a few high-profile cases to set an example and a precedent. Permitting these smaller payments has to impede the effort to crack down on the larger ones. Companies know this.

    “Facilitating” bribes are not tips. Tipping is voluntary, and you decide to do it after a service has been rendered. You don’t pay it at the outset to induce the waiter to bring the food, and you can always go somewhere else to eat next time should the service be bad.

    Nor are they welfare for underpaid civil servants. If government workers are underpaid, we should compensate them for the cost of customs inspections or airport security by aboveboard means, through taxation and so forth. Payment to individuals not only slows service but also encourages entrepreneurial civil servants to increase their income by creating more and greater obstacles.

    Nor are they a mere distraction from the fight against bigger bribes. Rather, they fuel the problem. Junior officials who look for small bribes rise to higher positions by paying off those above them. Corruption creates pyramids of illegal payments flowing upward. Legalizing the base of the pyramid gives it a strong and lasting foundation.

    Nor are these payments legal where they’re made. They may not be banned by the wealthy countries mentioned above, but they are outlawed in the countries where they’re actually a problem. Do developed countries want to say they wouldn’t tolerate such payments at home but don’t care if they’re made abroad? And since they’re illegal in the countries where they’re paid, companies can’t put them on their books. The classic cover for a bribe is to call it a “consulting fee”, but that is a books and records violation that is illegal in any country.

(www.forbes.com. Adaptado.)

Instrução: Leia o texto para responder a questão.

The Big Destructiveness Of The Tiny Bribe

Alexandra Wrage 03.01.2010

    The smallest bribes can be the most vexing. Not suitcases full of money and transfers to offshore accounts, but the thousands of everyday payments people make to Indian building inspectors, Chinese customs officials and Nigerian airport functionaries, just to get things done. They’re payments for routine government services that a government official is legally obliged to perform but for which he’s hoping to skim off a little extra.

    Unlike more serious bribes, these very modest payouts, formally known as “facilitating payments”, are not against the laws of the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Korea, when made abroad. They’re illegal for Great Britain, but the Serious Fraud Office there has taken the extraordinary public position that they’re unlikely to give rise to a prosecution.

    Why don’t governments that lead the fight against large-scale bribery fall in line with what is already the practice of many major companies? They don’t want to outlaw such small-scale graft in foreign places, they say, because they don’t have the manpower to prosecute violators. By that logic, communities with just enough resources to handle murder and armed robbery would give a green light to shoplifting. You’d think a government could at least go after a few high-profile cases to set an example and a precedent. Permitting these smaller payments has to impede the effort to crack down on the larger ones. Companies know this.

    “Facilitating” bribes are not tips. Tipping is voluntary, and you decide to do it after a service has been rendered. You don’t pay it at the outset to induce the waiter to bring the food, and you can always go somewhere else to eat next time should the service be bad.

    Nor are they welfare for underpaid civil servants. If government workers are underpaid, we should compensate them for the cost of customs inspections or airport security by aboveboard means, through taxation and so forth. Payment to individuals not only slows service but also encourages entrepreneurial civil servants to increase their income by creating more and greater obstacles.

    Nor are they a mere distraction from the fight against bigger bribes. Rather, they fuel the problem. Junior officials who look for small bribes rise to higher positions by paying off those above them. Corruption creates pyramids of illegal payments flowing upward. Legalizing the base of the pyramid gives it a strong and lasting foundation.

    Nor are these payments legal where they’re made. They may not be banned by the wealthy countries mentioned above, but they are outlawed in the countries where they’re actually a problem. Do developed countries want to say they wouldn’t tolerate such payments at home but don’t care if they’re made abroad? And since they’re illegal in the countries where they’re paid, companies can’t put them on their books. The classic cover for a bribe is to call it a “consulting fee”, but that is a books and records violation that is illegal in any country.

(www.forbes.com. Adaptado.)

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates airport security checkpoints in the United States, is spending upward of US$ 7 million a year trying to develop technology that can detect the evil intent of the terrorists among us. Yes, you read that correctly: They plan to find the bad guys by reading their minds.

Dozens of researchers across the country are in the middle of a five year program contracted primarily to the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, in Cambridge, Mass. They’ve developed a psycho-physiological theory of ‘malintent’ – basically, a hodgepodge of behaviorism and biometrics according to which physiological chances can give away a terrorist’s intention to do immediate harm. So far, they’ve spent US$ 20 million on biometric research, sensors, and a series of tests and demonstrations. This technology is called the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).

The underlying theory is that your body reacts, in measurable and largely involuntary ways, to reveal the nature of your intentions. So as you wait in line at the airport checkpoint, thermal and other types of cameras and laser- and radar-based sensors will try to get a fix on the baseline parameters of your autonomic nervous system – your body temperature, your heart rate and respiration, your skin’s moistness, and the very look in your eyes. Then, as a security officer asks you a few questions, the sensors will remeasure those parameters so that the FAST algorithms can figure out whether you’re naughty or nice, all on the spot, without knowing anything else about you.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates airport security checkpoints in the United States, is spending upward of US$ 7 million a year trying to develop technology that can detect the evil intent of the terrorists among us. Yes, you read that correctly: They plan to find the bad guys by reading their minds.

Dozens of researchers across the country are in the middle of a five year program contracted primarily to the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, in Cambridge, Mass. They’ve developed a psycho-physiological theory of ‘malintent’ – basically, a hodgepodge of behaviorism and biometrics according to which physiological chances can give away a terrorist’s intention to do immediate harm. So far, they’ve spent US$ 20 million on biometric research, sensors, and a series of tests and demonstrations. This technology is called the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).

The underlying theory is that your body reacts, in measurable and largely involuntary ways, to reveal the nature of your intentions. So as you wait in line at the airport checkpoint, thermal and other types of cameras and laser- and radar-based sensors will try to get a fix on the baseline parameters of your autonomic nervous system – your body temperature, your heart rate and respiration, your skin’s moistness, and the very look in your eyes. Then, as a security officer asks you a few questions, the sensors will remeasure those parameters so that the FAST algorithms can figure out whether you’re naughty or nice, all on the spot, without knowing anything else about you.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates airport security checkpoints in the United States, is spending upward of US$ 7 million a year trying to develop technology that can detect the evil intent of the terrorists among us. Yes, you read that correctly: They plan to find the bad guys by reading their minds.

Dozens of researchers across the country are in the middle of a five year program contracted primarily to the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, in Cambridge, Mass. They’ve developed a psycho-physiological theory of ‘malintent’ – basically, a hodgepodge of behaviorism and biometrics according to which physiological chances can give away a terrorist’s intention to do immediate harm. So far, they’ve spent US$ 20 million on biometric research, sensors, and a series of tests and demonstrations. This technology is called the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST).

The underlying theory is that your body reacts, in measurable and largely involuntary ways, to reveal the nature of your intentions. So as you wait in line at the airport checkpoint, thermal and other types of cameras and laser- and radar-based sensors will try to get a fix on the baseline parameters of your autonomic nervous system – your body temperature, your heart rate and respiration, your skin’s moistness, and the very look in your eyes. Then, as a security officer asks you a few questions, the sensors will remeasure those parameters so that the FAST algorithms can figure out whether you’re naughty or nice, all on the spot, without knowing anything else about you.