Questões de Vestibular Comentadas sobre interpretação de texto | reading comprehension em inglês

Foram encontradas 2.261 questões

Ano: 2014 Banca: FATEC Órgão: FATEC Prova: FATEC - 2014 - FATEC - Vestibular - Primeiro Semestre |
Q1264937 Inglês

Wearable tech for kids coming from LeapFrog

By Doug Gross, CNN

updated 12:57 PM EDT, Thu May 1, 2014


(CNN) – The wearable technology movement is in full effect, and exercise-based activity trackers lead the way. Now, it’s becoming child’s play.

      LeapFrog, the maker of education-oriented tablets and apps for children, has unveiled1 LeapBand, a wearable activity tracker designed with kids in mind.

      The band fits around the user’s wrist and looks a lot like a kids version of a smartwatch. By performing actions like “walk like a crab,” “spin like a helicopter” or “pop like popcorn,” kids can unlock new games and a group of Pokemon-like “digital pets” on the device.

      The band connects to a website or app that lets parents monitor their children’s activities and choose which challenges they can select, and which they can’t.

      Moving past smartphones and tablets, wearable tech has become arguably the hottest digital trend in the past year or so.

(http://tinyurl.com/noswsfc Acesso em: 20.07.2014. Adaptado)

Glossário 1

unveil: revelar, apresentar.

De acordo com o artigo
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: COPEVE-UFAL Órgão: UFAL Prova: COPEVE-UFAL - 2014 - UFAL - Vestibular - Sistemas de Informação |
Q834333 Inglês

       Pakistan army demands TV channel closure over assassination dispute


      Pakistan’s army demanded the closure of the country's most popular television channel on Tuesday following allegations that the military's main intelligence agency had ordered an assassination attempt on its star journalist.

Disponível em: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/pakistan-army-demands-tv-station-closure-assassination?CMP=EMCNEWEML661912>  Acesso em: 23 abr. 2014.  


O texto acima trata de:  

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Ano: 2014 Banca: COPEVE-UFAL Órgão: UFAL Prova: COPEVE-UFAL - 2014 - UFAL - Vestibular - Sistemas de Informação |
Q834332 Inglês

Popes John XXIII and John Paul II to be made saints in historic ceremony


As many as one million people are expected in Saint Peter's Square and nearby streets of Rome to witness the canonisation of popes John XXIII and John Paul II later today.

Disponível: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-27/an-two-popes-to-be-made-saints/5413850>. Acesso em: 27 abr. 2014.


O texto acima trata de:

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Ano: 2014 Banca: COPEVE-UFAL Órgão: UFAL Prova: COPEVE-UFAL - 2014 - UFAL - Vestibular - Sistemas de Informação |
Q834331 Inglês

               Heartburn drug Motilium should be restricted due to heart deaths, says medicines regulator


      Around two million people were prescribed Motilium, also known as domperidone, for sickness and nausea symptoms, stomach conditions and heartburn. Now following a review at European level, the drug will be restricted for those with sickness and nausea only. […] The drug is widely prescribed by GPs for babies with severe reflux and can continue to be used in this way under caution and when the doctor has carefully calculated the dose according to the child's weight and is satisfied they do not have a heart condition, a spokesman for the drugs regulator said.

Disponível em: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10788459/Heartburn-drug-Motilium-should-be-restricted-due-to-heart-deaths-says-medicines-regulator.html. Acesso em: 26 abr. 2014.  


O texto trata de:  

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Ano: 2014 Banca: CECIERJ Órgão: CEDERJ Prova: CECIERJ - 2014 - CEDERJ - Vestibular - 01 |
Q582685 Inglês
Are social networking sites addictive?

1With the increasing popularity of wireless devices like smartphones — devices that can move lots of data very quickly — users have access to their social networks 24 hours a day. Most social networking sites have developed applications for your mobile phone, so logging on is always convenient. Social networks also tap into our human desire to stay connected with others. Besides, the rush of nostalgia as you connect with your former grade-school classmate on Facebook can be quite heady and exciting.

2But what's the main reason we find these sites so addictive? Plain old narcissism. We broadcast our personalities online whenever we publish a thought, photo, YouTube video or answer one of those “25 Things About Me" memes. We put that information out there so people will respond and connect to us. And being part of a social network is sort of like having your own entourage that follows you everywhere, commenting on and applauding everything you do. It's very seductive.

3In 2008, researchers at the University of Georgia studied the correlation between narcissism and Facebook users. Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was. They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a selfpromoting way, rather than in a connective way. It may be an obvious theory, but it also suggests that social networks bring out the narcissist in all of us.

4Social networks are also a voyeuristic experience for many users. Following exchanges on Twitter or posts on Facebook and MySpace are akin to eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. It's entertaining and allows you to feel like a “fly on the wall" in someone else's life.

5Social networking sites also publicly list your “friends" or “followers" — giving you instant status. How many people do you know online who spend all their time trying to get more friends, more followers, more testimonials? We work hard in real life to elevate our statuses, make friends and search out boosters for our self-esteem. Online social networking provides this to us, and we don't even have to change out of our sweatshirts to get it.

(adapted from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/socialnetworking/information/social-networking-sites-addictive2.htm)

Glossary

addictive: viciante; tap into: explorar/tirar proveito; broadcast: anunciar; entourage: comitiva/séquito; akin to eavesdropping: parecido com bisbilhotar; booster: aquilo que impulsiona; sweatshirts: camisetas
Marque o enunciado que se refere, no texto, ao que seria a razão principal por trás do vício em redes sociais.
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: CECIERJ Órgão: CEDERJ Prova: CECIERJ - 2014 - CEDERJ - Vestibular - 01 |
Q582684 Inglês
Are social networking sites addictive?

1With the increasing popularity of wireless devices like smartphones — devices that can move lots of data very quickly — users have access to their social networks 24 hours a day. Most social networking sites have developed applications for your mobile phone, so logging on is always convenient. Social networks also tap into our human desire to stay connected with others. Besides, the rush of nostalgia as you connect with your former grade-school classmate on Facebook can be quite heady and exciting.

2But what's the main reason we find these sites so addictive? Plain old narcissism. We broadcast our personalities online whenever we publish a thought, photo, YouTube video or answer one of those “25 Things About Me" memes. We put that information out there so people will respond and connect to us. And being part of a social network is sort of like having your own entourage that follows you everywhere, commenting on and applauding everything you do. It's very seductive.

3In 2008, researchers at the University of Georgia studied the correlation between narcissism and Facebook users. Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was. They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a selfpromoting way, rather than in a connective way. It may be an obvious theory, but it also suggests that social networks bring out the narcissist in all of us.

4Social networks are also a voyeuristic experience for many users. Following exchanges on Twitter or posts on Facebook and MySpace are akin to eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. It's entertaining and allows you to feel like a “fly on the wall" in someone else's life.

5Social networking sites also publicly list your “friends" or “followers" — giving you instant status. How many people do you know online who spend all their time trying to get more friends, more followers, more testimonials? We work hard in real life to elevate our statuses, make friends and search out boosters for our self-esteem. Online social networking provides this to us, and we don't even have to change out of our sweatshirts to get it.

(adapted from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/socialnetworking/information/social-networking-sites-addictive2.htm)

Glossary

addictive: viciante; tap into: explorar/tirar proveito; broadcast: anunciar; entourage: comitiva/séquito; akin to eavesdropping: parecido com bisbilhotar; booster: aquilo que impulsiona; sweatshirts: camisetas
No quarto parágrafo, o autor usa a metáfora “fly on the wall" (uma mosca na parede) para ilustrar um comportamento que ele associa ao uso excessivo de redes sociais. Que comportamento seria esse?
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: CECIERJ Órgão: CEDERJ Prova: CECIERJ - 2014 - CEDERJ - Vestibular - 01 |
Q582683 Inglês
Are social networking sites addictive?

1With the increasing popularity of wireless devices like smartphones — devices that can move lots of data very quickly — users have access to their social networks 24 hours a day. Most social networking sites have developed applications for your mobile phone, so logging on is always convenient. Social networks also tap into our human desire to stay connected with others. Besides, the rush of nostalgia as you connect with your former grade-school classmate on Facebook can be quite heady and exciting.

2But what's the main reason we find these sites so addictive? Plain old narcissism. We broadcast our personalities online whenever we publish a thought, photo, YouTube video or answer one of those “25 Things About Me" memes. We put that information out there so people will respond and connect to us. And being part of a social network is sort of like having your own entourage that follows you everywhere, commenting on and applauding everything you do. It's very seductive.

3In 2008, researchers at the University of Georgia studied the correlation between narcissism and Facebook users. Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was. They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a selfpromoting way, rather than in a connective way. It may be an obvious theory, but it also suggests that social networks bring out the narcissist in all of us.

4Social networks are also a voyeuristic experience for many users. Following exchanges on Twitter or posts on Facebook and MySpace are akin to eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. It's entertaining and allows you to feel like a “fly on the wall" in someone else's life.

5Social networking sites also publicly list your “friends" or “followers" — giving you instant status. How many people do you know online who spend all their time trying to get more friends, more followers, more testimonials? We work hard in real life to elevate our statuses, make friends and search out boosters for our self-esteem. Online social networking provides this to us, and we don't even have to change out of our sweatshirts to get it.

(adapted from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/socialnetworking/information/social-networking-sites-addictive2.htm)

Glossary

addictive: viciante; tap into: explorar/tirar proveito; broadcast: anunciar; entourage: comitiva/séquito; akin to eavesdropping: parecido com bisbilhotar; booster: aquilo que impulsiona; sweatshirts: camisetas
The pronoun 'they' in “They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a self-promoting way, rather than in a connective way"(paragraph 3) refers to
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: CECIERJ Órgão: CEDERJ Prova: CECIERJ - 2014 - CEDERJ - Vestibular - 01 |
Q582682 Inglês
Are social networking sites addictive?

1With the increasing popularity of wireless devices like smartphones — devices that can move lots of data very quickly — users have access to their social networks 24 hours a day. Most social networking sites have developed applications for your mobile phone, so logging on is always convenient. Social networks also tap into our human desire to stay connected with others. Besides, the rush of nostalgia as you connect with your former grade-school classmate on Facebook can be quite heady and exciting.

2But what's the main reason we find these sites so addictive? Plain old narcissism. We broadcast our personalities online whenever we publish a thought, photo, YouTube video or answer one of those “25 Things About Me" memes. We put that information out there so people will respond and connect to us. And being part of a social network is sort of like having your own entourage that follows you everywhere, commenting on and applauding everything you do. It's very seductive.

3In 2008, researchers at the University of Georgia studied the correlation between narcissism and Facebook users. Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was. They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a selfpromoting way, rather than in a connective way. It may be an obvious theory, but it also suggests that social networks bring out the narcissist in all of us.

4Social networks are also a voyeuristic experience for many users. Following exchanges on Twitter or posts on Facebook and MySpace are akin to eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. It's entertaining and allows you to feel like a “fly on the wall" in someone else's life.

5Social networking sites also publicly list your “friends" or “followers" — giving you instant status. How many people do you know online who spend all their time trying to get more friends, more followers, more testimonials? We work hard in real life to elevate our statuses, make friends and search out boosters for our self-esteem. Online social networking provides this to us, and we don't even have to change out of our sweatshirts to get it.

(adapted from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/socialnetworking/information/social-networking-sites-addictive2.htm)

Glossary

addictive: viciante; tap into: explorar/tirar proveito; broadcast: anunciar; entourage: comitiva/séquito; akin to eavesdropping: parecido com bisbilhotar; booster: aquilo que impulsiona; sweatshirts: camisetas
According to the text, the difference between real life and online social networking is:
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: CECIERJ Órgão: CEDERJ Prova: CECIERJ - 2014 - CEDERJ - Vestibular - 01 |
Q582681 Inglês
Are social networking sites addictive?

1With the increasing popularity of wireless devices like smartphones — devices that can move lots of data very quickly — users have access to their social networks 24 hours a day. Most social networking sites have developed applications for your mobile phone, so logging on is always convenient. Social networks also tap into our human desire to stay connected with others. Besides, the rush of nostalgia as you connect with your former grade-school classmate on Facebook can be quite heady and exciting.

2But what's the main reason we find these sites so addictive? Plain old narcissism. We broadcast our personalities online whenever we publish a thought, photo, YouTube video or answer one of those “25 Things About Me" memes. We put that information out there so people will respond and connect to us. And being part of a social network is sort of like having your own entourage that follows you everywhere, commenting on and applauding everything you do. It's very seductive.

3In 2008, researchers at the University of Georgia studied the correlation between narcissism and Facebook users. Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was. They noted that narcissistic people use Facebook in a selfpromoting way, rather than in a connective way. It may be an obvious theory, but it also suggests that social networks bring out the narcissist in all of us.

4Social networks are also a voyeuristic experience for many users. Following exchanges on Twitter or posts on Facebook and MySpace are akin to eavesdropping on someone else's conversation. It's entertaining and allows you to feel like a “fly on the wall" in someone else's life.

5Social networking sites also publicly list your “friends" or “followers" — giving you instant status. How many people do you know online who spend all their time trying to get more friends, more followers, more testimonials? We work hard in real life to elevate our statuses, make friends and search out boosters for our self-esteem. Online social networking provides this to us, and we don't even have to change out of our sweatshirts to get it.

(adapted from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/socialnetworking/information/social-networking-sites-addictive2.htm)

Glossary

addictive: viciante; tap into: explorar/tirar proveito; broadcast: anunciar; entourage: comitiva/séquito; akin to eavesdropping: parecido com bisbilhotar; booster: aquilo que impulsiona; sweatshirts: camisetas
The use of the word 'unsurprisingly' in “Unsurprisingly, they found that the more “friends" and wall posts a user had, the more narcissistic he or she was." (paragraph 3) means that
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539022 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the last sentence of the text, the use of the phrase Argentina should hold its nose implies that Argentina should
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539021 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The last paragraph implies that
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539020 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the excerpt from the last paragraph – ... perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state – the expression financial rogue state implies a country which is
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539019 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


According to the sixth paragraph,
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539018 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The word hers, as used in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph, refers to the Argentine
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539017 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In its fifth paragraph, the article
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539016 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The excerpt from the fourth paragraph – had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. – denotes an idea of
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539015 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The fourth paragraph points out that
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539014 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


Argentina's government argues that it can't pay all creditors as required by court because
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539013 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


We learn in the article, mostly in paragraphs two through four, that
Alternativas
Ano: 2014 Banca: FGV Órgão: FGV Prova: FGV - 2014 - FGV - Vestibular - 1° Fase - Prova Tarde- 2015 |
Q539012 Inglês
Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the excerpt from the end of the second paragraph – freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up – the meaning of the phrase until Argentina coughs up in the context it is used can be paraphrased as until Argentina ...
Alternativas
Respostas
1701: D
1702: B
1703: D
1704: C
1705: C
1706: C
1707: D
1708: A
1709: B
1710: B
1711: C
1712: D
1713: A
1714: E
1715: C
1716: D
1717: B
1718: E
1719: A
1720: A