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Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254270
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
O pronome it, no final do texto, refere-se a
Ano: 2006
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
BACEN
Provas:
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 1 - Prova 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos
|
FCC - 2006 - BACEN - Analista do Banco Central - Área 2 - Conhecimentos Específicos |
Q2254263
Inglês
Texto associado
The Internet at Risk
Some 12,000 people convened last week in Tunisia for
a United Nations conference about the Internet. Many delegates
want an end to the U.S. Commerce Department's control over
the assignment of Web site addresses (for example,
http://www.washington-%20post.com/ ) and e-mail accounts (for
example, [email protected]). The delegates' argument is that
unilateral U.S. control over these domain names reflects no
more than the historical accident of the Internet's origins. Why
should the United States continue to control the registration of
French and Chinese Internet addresses? It doesn't control the
registration of French and Chinese cars, whatever Henry Ford's
historic role in democratizing travel was.
The reformers' argument is attractive in theory and
dangerous in practice. In an ideal world, unilateralism should be
avoided. But in an imperfect world, unilateral solutions that run
efficiently can be better than multilateral ones that ....51....
The job of assigning domain names offers huge
opportunities for abuse. ....52.... controls this function can decide to
keep certain types of individuals or organizations offline
(dissidents or opposition political groups, for example). Or it can
allow them on in exchange for large fees. The striking feature of
U.S. oversight of the Internet is that such abuses have not
occurred.
It's possible that a multilateral overseer of the Internet
might be just as efficient. But the ponderous International
Telecommunication Union, the U.N. body that would be a
leading candidate to take over the domain registry, has a record
of resisting innovation - including the advent of the Internet.
Moreover, a multilateral domain-registering body would
be caught between the different visions of its members: on the
one side, autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and China
that want to restrict access to the Internet; on the other side,
open societies that want low barriers to entry. These clashes of
vision would probably make multilateral regulation inefficiently
political.
You may say that this is a fair price to pay to uphold the
principle of sovereignty. If a country wants to keep certain users
from registering domain names (Nazi groups, child
pornographers, criminals), then perhaps it has a right to do so.
But the clinching argument is that countries can exercise that
sovereignty to a reasonable degree without controlling domain
names. They can order Internet users in their territory to take
offensive material down. They can order their banks or credit
card companies to refuse to process payments to unsavory Web sites based abroad. Indeed, governments' ample ability to
regulate the Internet has already been demonstrated by some of
the countries pushing for reform, such as authoritarian China.
The sovereign nations of the world have no need to wrest
control of the Internet from the United States, because they
already have it.
(Adapted from Washington Post, November 21, 2005; A14)
No texto, a palavra que preenche corretamente a lacuna é
Q2244803
Inglês
Texto associado
From the IPO to the First Trade: Is Underpricing Related to the
Trading Mechanism?
Sonia Falconieri, Albert Murphy and Daniel Weaver
As documented by a vast empirical literature, IPOs are
characterized by underpricing. Most of the theoretical literature
has linked the size of underpricing to the IPO procedure used on
the primary market. In this paper, by using a matched sample of
NYSE and Nasdaq IPOs, we show that the size of underpricing
also depends on the trading method used in the IPO
aftermarket.
There are two major methods of opening trading of initial
public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. The NYSE is an order-driven
market ...56... a call auction allows supply and demand to be
aggregated (at one location) prior to the start of trading. ...57... ,
Nasdaq is a quote-driven market. Dealers can only specify their
best quotes, and participants have ...58... idea of supply and
demand away from the inside quotes.
We propose a new proxy for ex ante uncertainty of firm
value and test it. Our results show that there is a larger level of
uncertainty at the beginning of trading on Nasdaq than on the
NYSE. This in turn is associated with larger levels of
underpricing for Nasdaq IPOs. We suggest that this may be due
to the different informational efficiency of the two trading
systems.
(http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?displayPage=%
2Fmarketinfo%2Fmarketinfo.html)
Para responder à questão, assinale, na folha de resposta, a letra correspondente à alternativa que preenche corretamente a lacuna do texto apresentado (...58...).
Ano: 2023
Banca:
OBJETIVA
Órgão:
Prefeitura de Pinto Bandeira - RS
Prova:
OBJETIVA - 2023 - Prefeitura de Pinto Bandeira - RS - Professor (Letras/Inglês) |
Q2243146
Inglês
Maya Angelou, known in literature for her
autobiographical works, is the author of:
Ano: 2003
Banca:
FCC
Órgão:
CVM
Prova:
FCC - 2003 - CVM - Analista - Planejamento e Execução Financeira |
Q2242131
Inglês
Texto associado
From the IPO to the First Trade: Is Underpricing Related to the
Trading Mechanism?
Sonia Falconieri, Albert Murphy and Daniel Weaver
As documented by a vast empirical literature, IPOs are
characterized by underpricing. Most of the theoretical literature
has linked the size of underpricing to the IPO procedure used on
the primary market. In this paper, by using a matched sample of
NYSE and Nasdaq IPOs, we show that the size of underpricing
also depends on the trading method used in the IPO
aftermarket.
There are two major methods of opening trading of initial
public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. The NYSE is an order-driven
market ....56... a call auction allows supply and demand to be
aggregated (at one location) prior to the start of trading. .....57.... ,
Nasdaq is a quote-driven market. Dealers can only specify their
best quotes, and participants have KK
58 idea of supply and
demand away from the inside quotes.
We propose a new proxy for ex ante uncertainty of firm
value and test it. Our results show that there is a larger level of
uncertainty at the beginning of trading on Nasdaq than on the
NYSE. This in turn is associated with larger levels of
underpricing for Nasdaq IPOs. We suggest that this may be due
to the different informational efficiency of the two trading
systems.
(http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/p1020656068262.html?displayPage=%
2Fmarketinfo%2Fmarketinfo.html)
Instruções: Para responder à questão,
assinale, na folha de respostas, a letra correspondente à alternativa que preenche corretamente a lacuna do texto apresentado.